

# Government Decision on the Objectives of Security of Supply

Upon presentation by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, the Government has decided as follows under section 2, subsection 2 of the Act on the Measures Necessary to Secure Security of Supply (1390/1992):

## 1. Introduction

Finland's security environment has changed fundamentally. This is also reflected in security of supply activities. New and increasingly severe threats require that the level of security of supply and preparedness be strengthened. In the years ahead, one of the priorities of improving security of supply will also be preparedness for military and hybrid threats.

Under the Act on the Measures Necessary to Secure Security of Supply, the Government sets the general objectives of security of supply that define the level of preparedness, taking account of the minimum needs of the population, essential economic activity and national defence. The Government Decision on the Objectives of Security of Supply defines the starting points, principles and national objectives for national security of supply work so that the level and scope of security of supply will meet the requirements of the changed security environment. It is essential to ensure a sufficient level of security of supply in order to be able to safeguard the production, services and infrastructure that are essential for the livelihood of the population, economic activity and national defence in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions, too.

In addition to strengthening national security of supply, security of supply will be strengthened by developing international cooperation through the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilaterally with various countries. Nordic preparedness and security of supply cooperation will also be developed.

This decision is not legally binding in the same way as legislation. It does, however, provide guidance and guidelines for central government and regional state authorities as well as municipal authorities, wellbeing services counties and other bodies responsible for security of supply and its management and development in their respective administrative branches. Security of supply planning will take place in cooperation with the ministries responsible for regional development and cohesion policy as well as with the regional and local levels, and security of supply will be recognised as part of the planning and implementation of regional development.

This decision also affects the planning, operational activities, strategy work and guidance of the activities of the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA), which operates horizontally. The carrying capacity of the National Emergency Supply Fund managed by NESA must be assessed, and the Fund must be sufficient for the implementation of this decision and for rapid response to measures required by the operating environment and to changing challenges. The long-term carrying capacity of the National Emergency Supply Fund must be safeguarded by assessing the criteria for determining the emergency supply contribution in conjunction with the reform of security of supply legislation.

The implementation of the objectives adopted in this decision may require additional funding, decisions on which will be made in the General Government Fiscal Plan, Budgetary Proposal and Supplementary Budget processes. Potential EU and NATO funding options must also be tapped into.

To monitor the implementation of the Government Decision on the Objectives of Security of Supply, an implementation plan will be drawn up, defining the responsibilities of the various authorities and the more detailed time frames for the measures.

In addition to the decision, security of supply regulation will be updated and developed to meet the requirements of the changed operating environment. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment has set up a broad-based working group to prepare the reform of security of supply legislation. The Government proposal for amending the Act on the Measures Necessary to Secure Security of Supply is intended to be submitted to Parliament in autumn 2025.

Particular attention in NESO's operations will be paid to modernising the material preparedness practices of security of supply so that they meet the needs arising from the rapid change. In addition, NESO's programme work will be assessed and developed.

This decision was prepared in broad cross-administrative cooperation where various stakeholders were consulted. Appointed by the Government, the National Emergency Supply Council took part in the preparation of the decision by providing the views of representatives of the private and third sectors in the sectors and pools of the National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO). A total of 130 comments were submitted concerning the draft decision on the objectives. In conjunction with the preparation, the ministries examined the sufficiency of preparedness, including material preparedness, in their respective administrative branches. The preparation of the decision also paid attention to other pending report and strategy projects linked with this decision.

## **2. Starting points of implementation of security of supply**

Security of supply means safeguarding the critical production, services and infrastructure essential for the livelihood of the population, the country's economic activity and national defence in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions. The starting points for national security of supply are well-functioning national and international markets, a diverse industrial and other production base, stable general government finances and a competitive national economy. Safeguarding of security of supply is based on well-functioning international political, economic and technological connections, including transport infrastructure, and their continuity. Preparedness for security of supply crises is always a national responsibility, supplemented by international preparedness.

When it comes to security of supply, the field of operations must be kept clear. It is difficult to prepare for all risks in advance, and not all incidents, even serious ones, are such that they could be managed with measures related to security of supply.

Security of supply is part of comprehensive security, a cooperation model for Finnish preparedness in accordance with the Security Strategy for Society. A key role from the security of supply perspective is played by interaction between the various actors (the authorities, private and third sectors and citizens) at the local, regional, national and international levels. The cooperation model for comprehensive security was adopted by the Government Resolution on the Security Strategy for Society (of 2 November 2017).

Finland's national risk assessment identifies risks that have a wide national impact and assesses their impact on the vital functions of society. The national risk assessment is linked with national preparedness and lays the foundation for preparedness in line with the Security Strategy for Society.

The nationwide set of joint risk assessments of various actors consists of the national as well as regional risk assessments.

The Government will direct, supervise and coordinate the safeguarding of functions vital to society. Each competent ministry will do the same in its own administrative branch. The ministries are responsible for security of supply and develop it in their respective sectors in accordance with the Government Rules of Procedure (262/2003) and special legislation. Each administrative branch must also continuously assess the risks relating to security of supply. Security of supply will be developed in close cross-administrative cooperation.

Concurrently with the comprehensive reform of the Emergency Powers Act (1552/2011), a comprehensive sector-specific review of regulation concerning incidents and crisis situations will be conducted in all administrative branches.

Operating in the administrative branch of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) is tasked with developing cooperation between the public sector and businesses in security of supply matters. Guidance of NESA is a duty of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. Guidance will be developed systematically so that the objectives of the administrative branches of the competent ministries will be taken into account more systematically in cooperation carried out with NESA. The development of guidance will also take account of the Government-level strategic guidance documents and relevant legislation. The guidance model of NESA will also be examined in conjunction with the reform of the security of supply legislation.

The NESA Board of Directors guides the work of the sectors and pools and adopts the common objectives for their operations. Enterprises, authorities and third-sector organisations that are critical for security of supply take part in the security of supply cooperation. The sectors, pools and committees of the National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO) form a cooperation structure with extensive coverage of the value and supply chains essential for security of supply as well as the key actors involved in them. The infrastructure, services and production critical for security of supply are mainly owned and operated by private-sector actors. Enterprises therefore play a key role in NESO.

Several critical enterprises are under foreign ownership or transnational enterprises. Publicly controlled organisations also need production inputs from international markets to enable their operations.

Enterprises are responsible for their own preparedness and continuity management and for fulfilling the obligations defined in sectoral legislation. In their own operations, enterprises prepare for risks posing a threat to their business conditions. NESA is tasked with supporting enterprises that are critical for security of supply so that security of supply can be safeguarded as well as possible in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions.

In some circumstances, the level of security of supply required in the changed security situation may not be reached on market terms or by means of contract-based preparedness. All administrative branches must identify the key development priorities in terms of the development of security of supply and carry out a comprehensive review of regulation concerning incidents and crisis situations to ensure regulatory up-to-date and effective.

NESA and the ministries responsible for preparedness must organise their activities in a way that does not jeopardise the competitive neutrality between economic operators unless there are strong reasons for this relating to emergency conditions and justified by national defence or national security aspects.

The Government issued a new Government Resolution on the State Ownership Policy on 23 May 2024 (Publications of the Finnish Government 2024:30). According to the Resolution, the State takes into consideration the geopolitical dimension and security of supply aspects from the Finnish perspective in contexts including ownership strategies of companies and when defining societal interests.

Under the Act on the Autonomy of Åland (1144/1991), the legislative powers concerning Åland are divided between the State of Finland and the autonomous region of Åland. The division of legislative powers determines the division of administrative powers. Therefore, Åland and the State have administrative powers in matters falling within their respective legislative powers. Accordingly, the security of supply of Åland falls partly within the powers of Åland and partly within the powers of the State. The authorities cooperate in preparedness matters as laid down in the Decree on the Attendance in Åland to Tasks Relating to Preparedness to Emergencies (900/2000). Åland is a demilitarised area. Security of supply measures must be adapted to ensure security and security of supply while maintaining the demilitarised status of Åland.

## **2.1 Changed operating environment of security of supply**

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has destabilised Finland's foreign and security policy operating environment significantly for a long term. The tension created by Russia's war of aggression and the increase in the great power competition between the West and China are challenging existing security of supply based on long and vulnerable global supply chains. The damage to the gas pipeline and the telecommunications cable between Finland and Estonia also highlights the vulnerability of critical subsea infrastructure. The changed operating environment necessitates the prioritisation and development in particular of critical infrastructure and services, cybersecurity, availability of the most critical commodities, and response to rapidly changing hybrid threats.

The digitalisation of society's functions has resulted in various services and processes being largely based on information and communications technology, automation systems, sensor technologies and well-functioning data connections. At the same time, the continuity of society's digital functions and services has become dependent on digital infrastructure, its services and the often long and international supply chains of their providers.

Digitalisation calls for the continuous review and improvement of the operating model of the security of supply system and the principles of its implementation, making use of the opportunities provided by digitalisation.

Cross-border threats such as pandemics and CBRNE threats may interfere with the implementation of the security of supply objectives. CBRNE threats mean the misuse of chemical substances (C), biological pathogens (B), radioactive material (R), nuclear weapons (N) and explosives (E) and related risk of accidents. Cross-border threats cannot be efficiently prepared for through national actions alone.

Climate change and biodiversity loss affect society and its vital functions in various ways, and their advancement constitutes a risk to Finland's security of supply. Mitigation of and adaptation to climate change and biodiversity loss, as well as clean energy will be taken into account in the development of security of supply and related measures, unless otherwise required to safeguard security of supply.

The trend in population structure affects the operating environment of security of supply regarding all areas, sectors and actors. Factors relating to the population structure with negative impacts on security of supply must be identified and prevented.

## **2.2 Nordic, European and global dimension of security of supply**

Ensuring national security of supply necessitates more extensive cooperation with Sweden, other Nordic countries and countries in the Baltic Sea region as well as with the EU and NATO and their Member States. Bilateral cooperation with various states and partners can strengthen domestic security of supply. The various administrative branches must identify cooperation that directly or indirectly promotes security of supply and is beneficial from the Finnish perspective.

Nordic cooperation to develop preparedness is close and has a long history. It also creates good conditions for the development of civilian–military cooperation in strengthening society's comprehensive security. The NATO membership of Finland and Sweden means that all Nordic countries are covered as Alliance members by the arrangements relating to the Defence Planning Process and Host Nation Support.

Operating models for international security of supply work may include shared stockpiling, mechanisms for providing and receiving international assistance, production reservations, joint procurements, and research and development policy.

Finland promotes the creation of the EU Preparedness Union based on comprehensive security and the formulation of the related Preparedness Union Strategy (EU/171/2023-VNK-25). The strategy would be based on the comprehensive security approach and would take account of the need of all EU policy sectors to prepare for incidents and crises. The strategy aims to improve coordination between the sectors and the preparedness situation picture and to bring the various sectors' measures and plans relating to preparedness together to form a coherent policy. In addition, the aim is for the strategy to build the capacities of the Union and Member States and preparedness cooperation between them and also to take into account as broadly as possible the preparedness role of the private and third sectors as well as citizens. EU-level networks of private-sector actors that are critical for preparedness and security of supply must also be established. Their objective will be to promote preparedness cooperation and sharing of best practices between actors, taking account of a well-functioning internal market and fair competition conditions.

At the EU level, continuity management must be developed in addition to material preparedness. Building production capacity and maintaining existing capacity within the EU must be promoted particularly in sectors that are strategically significant to Finland's security of supply. The functioning of the internal market of the EU must be ensured in various crisis situations, also including the maintenance of such production and logistics connections that enable the sufficient production capacity of critical industry within the EU. At the same time, it is important to take the global market into consideration and ensure that the EU will remain a competitive and open market as well as to support the diversification of the production chains of enterprises by developing the EU's free trade agreement and partnership network.

NATO has an important role as a developer of military planning and capabilities. NATO's ability to implement and plan collective defence operations requires significant support from civilian authorities and the private sector. Strengthening national resilience is the responsibility of each NATO member, but NATO sets common objectives for the member states, monitors their fulfilment and supports the member states in achieving them, including in Host Nation Support arrangements. These must be taken into account in national security of supply work as part of comprehensive national defence.

### **3. Backgrounds and objectives of development priorities**

#### **3.1 Critical infrastructure**

Critical infrastructure customarily means the basic structures, services and related functions that are essential for maintaining society's vital functions. Critical infrastructure includes physical facilities and structures as well as electronic and digital functions and services. Components of critical infrastructure include energy production, transmission and distribution systems and sourcing of raw materials; transport and logistics services and transport networks; underwater and underground cables and pipelines; society's information pools and information systems as well as communications networks and services; payment and securities transactions systems; secure time and positioning systems; monitoring systems for telecommunications and environmental conditions; satellite service systems enabling the work of the Defence Forces and other authorities; (physical and other) structures, including applications, enabling space activities; food supply, water services and waste management; and health and social services.

Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (CER Directive) lays down obligations for critical entities to improve their resilience, provisions on the supervision of critical entities and implementation, and rules concerning the identification of critical entities of particular European significance. It also establishes common rules for cooperation between Member States and for reporting on the application of the Directive. The CER Directive lays down provisions specifically on the Member States' obligations to carry out risk assessments and identify the critical entities that provide essential services. The CER Directive will be implemented effectively nationally. The Directive aims to enhance the crisis resilience of critical infrastructure, improve the resilience and continuity management of entities and, consequently, to strengthen societal crisis resilience and national security. The preparedness obligations laid down for private actors and the operating model for cooperation between the authorities support cooperation structures between private actors and the authorities.

The CER Directive also contains a definition of critical infrastructure: 'critical infrastructure' means an asset, facility, equipment, a network or a system, or a part of an asset, a facility, a network or a system, which is necessary for the provision of an essential service. The Directive defines 'essential service' as a service which is crucial for the maintenance of vital societal functions, economic activities, public health and safety, or the environment.

Critical infrastructure is largely maintained by businesses whose operations are often interdependent. Several authorities have official duties relating to critical infrastructure.

The EU's ability to function in crises faced by Europe is particularly important for Finland, including the development of response to hybrid threats (the EU Hybrid Toolbox). The EU Hybrid Toolbox

brings together existing EU instruments that can be used for coordinated response to hybrid campaigns.

As the security environment changes, Finland is preparing for the possibility of becoming a target of exceptional, extensive and multifaceted hybrid influence activities both in the short and long term. The protection of critical infrastructure that is essential for society's functional capacity, vital functions, the health, wellbeing and livelihood of the population, the country's economic activity and national defence will be improved. The means of ensuring the critical infrastructure maintaining society's vital functions must be assessed, having regard to sector-specific needs, to a sufficiently high level in all circumstances threatening continuity management. The protective measures must cover preventive measures, action during incidents, and post-incident measures. Achieving the objective requires not only regulation and contractual preparedness but also broad-based and multiple-level cooperation between the public and private sectors.

Cooperation and information exchange between the competent ministries, the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) and other authorities will be intensified in defining, identifying and protecting critical sites. In addition, the need to protect information, such as spatial data, concerning critical infrastructure will be examined. In serious incidents under normal conditions, the management and cooperation practices and cooperation platforms agreed between the competent ministries, NESA, other authorities and businesses will enable incident management and cooperation. Particular attention will be paid to maintaining, streamlining and developing these practices and cooperation platforms.

The protection of critical infrastructure will be improved by amending the Act on the Screening of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions (172/2012) (Foreign Corporate Acquisitions Act) to take risks relating to national security, security of supply and large-scale influencing more efficiently into account. Enterprises that are essential for the functioning of critical infrastructure are subject to screening under the Foreign Corporate Acquisitions Act. Ownership of real estate is also controlled from the perspective of safeguarding security of supply in accordance with the Act on Transfers of Real Estate Requiring Special Permission (470/2019) and the Act on the Expropriation of Immovable Property and Special Rights to Ensure National Security (468/2019).

Together with the National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO), NESA will support critical business enterprises in preparedness planning and promotes measures to safeguard the activities of these entities. In addition, NESA will attend to the continuous development of response, cooperation and capacity for repairs in cooperation with enterprises and authorities. Joint exercise activity and testing of plans and preparedness arrangements will be developed in preparedness activities to eliminate identified weaknesses and deploy lessons learned to support the preparedness of critical enterprises. For example, exercises relating to cybersecurity and their results are significant, through society's digitalisation, to almost all sectors.

### **3.2 Digital society**

The continuity of society's vital functions and the achievement of the security of supply objectives will be promoted by strengthening the operational reliability and security of digital society. In ensuring the security and resilience of digital society, particular regard will be paid to digital infrastructure, digital information pools and systems, and cybersecurity. The safeguarding of these must take account of monitoring and control arrangements, physical and technical protection, data connections, and duplication and redundancy of technical systems. In addition, capability for fault

recovery, availability of electricity, spare parts, competence and other essential resources, and the securing of and exercise activities for operating and supplier networks must be ensured.

To ensure security of supply, society must be able to tolerate incidents in the digital operating environment by means of system-wide replacement practices, backup systems and data connections. With digitalisation evolving, network cooperation for digital security will also be developed to support the implementation of supply of security measures.

### **Digital infrastructure**

In digital security, the primary security of supply objective is to ensure the functioning of the data connections and services required by the critical functions of the entire society, including in sparsely populated areas, and their robustness and resilience. Measures must cover securing international data connections and the necessary capacity for repairs, including for submarine data connections. One of the key priorities is developing satellite positioning, time data and satellite connections securing these. Where possible, the safeguarding of digital infrastructure will make use of international cooperation, especially between the Nordic countries.

### **Digital information pools**

It is central with regard to digital information pools to safeguard the exploitability of information and the availability, integrity and protection of information assets so that they can also be relied upon in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions. Continuity management of the secure transmission and storage of critical information must be ensured. In addition, it must be ensured that open databases do not contain freely available information relating to sectors and sites that are critical for security of supply that could jeopardise national security, national defence or military security of supply. The protection of critical national information pools is a priority in situations where international data connections are restricted or have to be restricted by Finland.

Information pools, services and systems that are critical for society will be defined and identified, and their operational reliability and security will be ensured.

### **Digital systems**

The safeguarding and development of the security of supply of digital systems critical for society will take account of the continuity of the critical functionalities of existing systems, and new solutions will be developed proactively to manage the risks relating to threats emerging rapidly in the digital transformation. These include national situation picture systems for disruption management, cybersecurity and defence systems, national cryptographic capabilities, and new technologies and their producers. For example, as quantum technology, artificial intelligence technologies and robotics evolve, their impacts on the implementation of security of supply and continuity management must be taken into account in preparedness. Increased attention must be paid in the near future to the protection of local and remote-controlled automation and other systems contained by the built environment, in particular when these are connected with functions of critical infrastructure.

### **Cybersecurity**

Finland takes a proactive approach to cyber threats. Cybersecurity is a cross-administrative theme that applies to all administrative branches. Finland's national strategy concerning cybersecurity has been updated to respond to the changed operating environment (Finland's Cyber Security Strategy 2024–2035, Publications of the Prime Minister's Office 2024:13). The cybersecurity of society's critical functions will be developed so that the planning and implementation of preparedness measures

will be based on risk management and, in addition, cybersecurity throughout the life cycle of systems and sector-specific special needs will be taken into account. In addition to protecting functions, detecting incidents and responding to them, attention will also be paid to post-incident recovery.

The EU has responded to the changed cyber environment by adopting Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive). The NIS 2 Directive harmonises the minimum levels of cybersecurity risk management and reporting obligations concerning critical sectors of society. Finland implements the obligations as part of national legislation.

To ensure security of supply, cybersecurity will be enhanced in close cooperation with businesses and the third sector both nationally and internationally, taking account of the fact that a large part of critical infrastructure is in private ownership. Finnish cybersecurity and information security competence will be ensured by investing in a concrete manner in education and training in the field. Particular account will be taken of the opportunity for continuing education to increase information security and cybersecurity competence in the public sector. To support critical actors, situation picture, information exchange and observation capacity of a sufficiently high quality must be produced to define and implement up-to-date protective measures. Exercises of a sufficient scope will be organised to support the development of preparedness measures, maintenance of preparedness, and cooperation.

### **3.3 Citizens' preparedness**

Independent preparedness and the population's good security skills are important elements of preparedness and security of supply and improve society's crisis resilience. Independent preparedness of households provides the authorities with scope for action and releases authorities' resources for restoring the situation to normal in various crisis situations. Good household preparedness in itself strengthens society's crisis resilience considerably. The capacity of households to act in crisis situations must be developed purposefully. Civic skills, including information and media literacy, must be taken into account as part of teaching, education and training. Operating models for the independent preparedness of households must also be developed by increasing education, training and communication. Multilingualism and use of multiple channels must be ensured in communication. Third-sector organisations also play a key role in preparedness and management of various crisis situations as well as in training and communication relating to these skills. Clear and timely communication by the authorities in crisis situations is also essential.

The authorities and third-sector organisations have together prepared 72-hour preparedness recommendations for households. The contents of the preparedness recommendations and preparedness activities engaging local communities will be developed. A training programme has also been designed around the recommendations.

Psychological resilience is part of comprehensive security. Good psychological resilience to crises facilitates the recovery process. Citizens' trust in the authorities and political decisions has major impacts on society's psychological resilience and on coping with and recovery from crises. Culture also supports psychological resilience.

Fishing, hunting and picking wild berries and mushrooms as well as subsistence farming strengthen independent preparedness. Recreational use of nature maintains citizens' physical and mental fitness and functional capacity in various situations. Recreational use of nature means spending time in the

natural environment for recreational purposes during leisure time. Ensuring opportunities for citizens' independent shooting practice strengthens civic skills, the maintenance of physical fitness and the functional capacity of communities for leisure activities in both the maintenance of comprehensive security in normal conditions and in different crisis situations. The responsible authorities will ensure the coverage of opportunities for shooting practice.

### **3.4 Regional dimension of security of supply**

The objective for security of supply activity at the regional level is that regional functions critical for security of supply will have been safeguarded particularly in long-term and serious incidents through cooperation between the various actors. This activity also supports and develops the crisis-resilient cooperation of the various actors. The main duties of regional security of supply activity are supporting the continuity management and coordinating the preparedness measures of businesses and authorities, maintaining and developing cooperation networks for preparedness of businesses, conducting regional risk assessments from the security of supply perspective, and continuous development of regional security of supply.

The National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO) and the authorities responsible for preparedness and security of supply will maintain and develop the cross-sectoral preparedness required to ensure security of supply at the regional level and ensure the regional cooperation and information exchange of businesses, public administration and the third sector, also identifying and taking account of communities operating at the local level. Development work will take account of regional and local specific characteristics and differences affecting preparedness. The development, and coordination with other operations, of the regional operations of NESO must continue. The coordination of regional and local preparedness will be promoted in line with the Security Committee recommendation of 22 June 2022<sup>1</sup>.

As part of the central government reforms of regional state administration, a reform will be prepared where part of the current duties of the Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment as well as certain other development and funding duties will be brought together under the new Economic Development Centres to be established. The coordination duty concerning regional preparedness will be examined as part of the reform of regional state administration. Cooperation between public administration and businesses in security of supply matters will be supported by the upcoming Economic Development Centres. The aim is for the Economic Development Centres to be operational in 2026.

The ministries will cooperate to identify any needs for legislative amendments in their respective administrative branches in order to develop and clarify competence, cooperation and management processes in regional security of supply activities. The ministries' performance guidance processes will pay attention to matters relating to security of supply. National, regional and local-level authorities and the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) will deepen their cooperation relating to exercise activity and producing the situation picture.

Formulated in cooperation between the public, private and third sectors, the regional risk assessments will provide a risk-based foundation for regional-level security of supply and preparedness work. Regional and local-level authorities responsible for preparedness and security of supply will update and, where necessary, produce in cooperation with NESO's regional actors, preparedness plans regarding key national and regional risks. The continuous risk assessment processes at both the

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<sup>1</sup> Security Committee recommendation (in Finnish)

national and regional level must result in risk management measures and a higher level of preparedness.

Regional preparedness planning will be linked more closely with the planning and guidance of national-level security of supply. Regional preparedness plans will identify and take account of the special characteristics of the various regions and third-sector actors.

The municipalities and wellbeing services counties play a key role in local and regional efforts to ensure society's security of supply and basic public services. This is underscored in duties related to the crisis resilience of critical infrastructure and the functional capacity and psychological resilience of the population. The municipalities' opportunities to take care of security of supply will be developed, and security of supply cooperation between municipalities will be promoted.

The wellbeing services counties, municipalities, joint municipal authorities and other consortiums of municipalities play an important role in safeguarding the continuity of functions that are critical for security of supply. Both through contractual procedures and coordination of preparedness plans, they will ensure the continuity of their own critical functions in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions, too.

In cooperation with the responsible ministries, central government and NESO, the municipalities and wellbeing services counties will produce preparedness recommendations for functions under their responsibility that are critical for security of supply. In addition, the municipalities and wellbeing services counties will develop network cooperation relating to preparedness and security of supply and will identify, in cooperation with NESO, the prerequisites for closer cooperation with NESO. Network cooperation will identify and take account of the role of third-sector actors operating in rural areas and in particular in sparsely populated areas.

### **3.5 Situation monitoring and foresight in security of supply**

Situation picture and foresight activities play a key role in the rapidly changing operating environment. To safeguard security of supply, events and phenomena posing a threat to security of supply must be identified proactively. This objective will be reached by producing an up-to-date and comprehensive situation picture enabling the detection of the interdependencies and ripple effects of various actors. Efforts to produce the situation picture will also support the own continuity management of organisations critical for security of supply and the timely launch of appropriate measures. The monitoring of the operating environment will produce analyses and foresight data for the targeting of decisions and measures supporting security of supply.

The Government carries out cross-administrative strategic foresight that produces proactive analyses of the operating environment to support preparedness-related decision-making. Strategic foresight across administrative branches will enable a shared understanding of the entire Government and the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESO) also concerning future phenomena and trends affecting security of supply. NESO will collect foresight data from actors critical for security of supply through its pool network and in this way will support the Government's cross-administrative foresight.

The delivery and analysis of information require networked cooperation. The up-to-date situation picture and sharing of information can be used extensively to promote and guide the independent continuity management and preparedness of the various actors of society, in particular enterprises. As regards information delivery, attention should be paid to the dissemination of key classified information without delay, and to the two-way delivery of information. In addition, it must be ensured

that all relevant authority actors have access to security-classified systems and that personnel have valid data processing rights and security clearances.

The Government Situation Centre is responsible for producing, analysing and disseminating a situation picture relating to the security situation to support decision-making by the President of the Republic and the Government in accordance with the Act on the Government Situation Centre (300/2017). NESO will compile an up-to-date and comprehensive situation picture from the National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO). The Government Situation Centre and NESO will develop their cooperation in situation awareness. Comprehensive situation awareness requires that sufficient data access rights are ensured for the necessary authority actors. The network of Finnish missions of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs plays an important role in monitoring and reporting on international developments relating to security of supply.

Shared situation picture and communications tools will be developed and their use practised to prepare for serious incidents.

### **3.6 Competence and availability of skilled labour**

It is a shared challenge for all sectors to ensure the competence of personnel. The availability of skilled labour is also an issue reflected in security of supply work. The management of critical competence in key sectors will be assessed in cross-administrative cooperation with the National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO). The objective is to prepare for the key sectors a short- and long-term roadmap to solve competence bottlenecks in duties critical for security of supply. The roadmap will describe the current status of competence needs, the network of education and training providers, the challenges and proposed solutions, and measures proposed on the basis of these. Business and enterprise representatives will be included in the preparation of the roadmap. The preservation of education and training packages critical for security of supply will be ensured in the education and training supply of higher education institutions and vocational education and training. The preparation of the roadmap will commence with a pilot project.

The comprehensive reform of the Emergency Powers Act will include the assessment, as part of official duties, of how to secure the availability of skilled labour in emergency conditions under the Emergency Powers Act in occupational groups critical for society's functioning.

It is important that small and medium-sized enterprises as well as citizens are aware of the significance of competence and skills in safeguarding security of supply.

## **4. Objectives and development priorities of security of supply in the various administrative branches**

The objective of preparedness is to safeguard the continuity of the functioning of vital services and infrastructure in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions. The key objective in sector-specific preparedness relating to security of supply is to identify the functions, and interdependencies between functions, the incident-free functioning of which is essential for Finland's security of supply. Increased interdependencies call for improved identification and management of critical value chains. The ministries and the National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO) will promote sectoral cooperation in normal conditions, which can be expanded to the requirements of serious incidents under normal conditions and of emergency conditions.

The ministries will manage, supervise and coordinate in their respective sectors' preparedness under the Emergency Powers Act, which lays down provisions concerning emergency conditions. In line with the obligation under the Emergency Powers Act, the authorities must ensure the preparation of their emergency plans, prior preparation of emergency operations and other measures. A special priority in preparedness planning is preparedness for the use of military force and for hybrid threats and geopolitical risks.

The NESO pools will take care of the preparation of the general preparedness plans of businesses in their respective sectors and support the preparedness planning of enterprises belonging to the pool. The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) will formulate an overall view of the preparedness plans of businesses for critical sectors.

To safeguard security of supply, the State must ensure, by means of the necessary measures, the availability of the critical competence and service provision relating to national security interests. The availability of labour critical for security of supply must be ensured as well as possible also in situations where cross-border mobility is restricted. To enable the working of personnel critical for security of supply, basic public services must also function in crisis situations.

The responsible authorities will prepare the plan and measures in cooperation with NESO to ensure the availability of laboratory services, taking account of situations involving chemical, biological or radiation hazards.

#### **4.1 Energy supply**

Security of energy supply is based on a diverse and distributed heat and power generation structure, stored fuels, well-functioning energy markets, diverse fuel procurement sources, reliable transmission and distribution systems, and sectoral integration, which means the integration of the different energy sectors so that they can balance each other's consumption and production peaks.

The energy system is undergoing electrification, and the production of wind and solar energy is increasing rapidly, which is why the operating conditions for weather-independent and regulation-capable modes of energy production as well as for demand response and energy storage must be ensured. Technology making use of clean hydrogen will be taken into account as part of the clean energy system of the future and the development of energy storage.

A key aspect is the operational reliability of transmission and distribution systems in case of incidents, too. In addition, data connections essential for the systems must be ensured. The availability of competent personnel, spare parts and components as well as repair equipment must be ensured.

Hydroelectric and nuclear power play an important role as baseload and regulating power in the power system, and in safeguarding the system's sufficient stability and inertia (the ability of a power system to oppose changes in frequency due to resistance provided by the kinetic energy of rotating masses connected to the system). The feasibility of regional islanding suitable for power restoration must be examined. The functioning of functions critical for security in society, such as fuel distribution, the transport charging network and supply of daily consumer goods, in the event of long-term incidents affecting access to power must be ensured. Almost all modes of heat production are dependent on electricity, which must be taken into account in security of supply planning concerning electricity. Energy users' own preparedness for energy supply disruptions must be promoted.

Heat production is undergoing electrification, but there will still be a long period where heat generation will be based on the use of fuels. District heat production capacity and fuel logistics must be safeguarded. Safeguarding the operating conditions for combined heat and power (CHP) production contributes towards the maintenance of a reliable district heat system.

Actors in the various sectors of society must plan preparedness measures and assignment of responsibilities for the measures in case of disruptions in energy distribution. Preparedness cooperation between enterprises, the authorities and the third sector in the implementation of preparedness planning must be developed. Regular exercises must be conducted at all levels to practise cooperation between the various sectors in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions.

Society's information intensity and system interdependence are reflected particularly in the growing interdependence of transport, communications and energy systems. This dependence will grow in the future as the transition to digital transport services and autonomous means of transport takes place.

The development of material preparedness must be assessed particularly as regards critical spare parts. The availability of wood-based fuels must be improved in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions by developing the storage of wood fuels for security of supply needs. Sufficiency of wood must be ensured by creating in Finland a wood terminal network or a similar solution to ensure availability that will also take account of security of supply needs by ensuring the condition of low-volume roads and bridges, incentivising silviculture, and ensuring the availability of skilled labour and suitable equipment. When transitioning to a new energy system, security of supply in heat production, such as the status of fuel peat, must be ensured during the period of transition.

The level of fuel storage must be defined on the basis of needs during crises, which is where consumption needs of those including heat and power production capacity as well as transport, military national defence and internal security authorities must be assessed. The starting point for the assessment is the need for energy for at least five months of crisis. Oil storage must also take account of potential problems with access to gas. Fossil fuels play an important role in preparedness due to their good storability.

The emergency stockpiling of renewable fuels must be assessed. In addition, the expansion of the emergency supply contribution for bioenergy will be assessed. The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESAs) is responsible for emergency stockpiling and enterprises are responsible for compulsory stockpiling. The easing of fuel quality requirements and fuel use permit conditions in emergency conditions should be considered. The continuity of transport of fuels by land and sea must be safeguarded.

Compulsory stockpiling of oil outside Finland may account for a maximum of 30%. As regards emergency stockpiling, opportunities for Nordic cooperation must be assessed. Emergency stockpiling will be developed in cooperation with NATO, also taking account of military aspects. The volume target and location of jet fuel stockpiling must also be assessed, taking account of military national defence needs.

Compulsory stockpiling of fuels must be developed, taking account of the fact that the distribution obligation for transport fuels based on renewable energy affects the determination of the stockpiling obligation. Due to bottlenecks in LNG logistics, the compulsory stockpiling of natural gas will also be developed, in particular to ensure the usability of CHP capacity in preparedness for power

consumption peaks. The growing significance of hydrogen, biogas and other renewable gases must be taken into account as regards both pipeline gas and off-grid use.

Plans concerning the rationing of electricity, district heat and liquid fuels and the safeguarding of wood supply must be updated.

The State must have a majority shareholding and a controlling interest in the transmission system operators (TSOs) for electricity and natural gas and in the most important natural gas import connections. Municipalities are owners in many energy companies, whereby it is justifiable to take account of security of supply in the ownership steering of energy companies owned by municipalities. Legislation will ensure the functional capacity of the electricity and gas transmission networks and their TSOs and will guide their operations in emergency conditions.

## **4.2 Transport continuity**

Finland's logistic position has changed due to Russia's war of aggression, and the change is estimated to be permanent. This is also reflected in transport and the development and planning of the transport system and infrastructure. Climate change and measures aiming for its mitigation affect transport and transport systems. Digitalisation enables operational development, such as making use of positioning and control systems as well as related applications based on digital systems in logistics. Finland must develop the information pools concerning transport infrastructure and services to support critical transport.

The transport operations necessary for the vital functions of society and the livelihood of the population will be safeguarded in all situations. Transport infrastructure and key logistics chains as well as maintenance, repair and spare part services in accordance with EU regulation, as well as access to propulsion energy, will be ensured.

The transport needs of civilian society and military national defence must be coordinated. Both will be ensured sufficient capacities to operate in case the readiness of the Defence Forces is raised and in emergency conditions. A significant share of society's transport will take place on market terms even in emergency conditions.

The functioning and safety of the transport logistics system and the domestic and foreign trade transport operations critical for the functioning of society and security of supply (including the required support services) will be ensured in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions. The land, air and maritime transport links of Finland's foreign trade, land border crossings, logistics centres, terminals, ports, airports and country-internal transport operations critical for the livelihood of the population, working life and industries will be ensured in serious incidents under normal conditions as well as in emergency conditions. The continuous existence of the merchant fleet of Finnish shipping companies will be ensured. Where necessary, the State of Finland is prepared to provide central government guarantees for non-life insurance policies issued by insurance institutions, that is, in practice, to take the place of the reinsurer in situations where commercial insurance is unobtainable. Further provisions on insurance guarantees are laid down in the Act on Insurance Guarantees for Emergency Conditions (408/2007).

The safeguarding of transport must take account of Finland's dependence on international networks and markets. The best possible operational reliability and continuity of Finland's year-round maritime transport must be safeguarded. In serious incidents under normal conditions, alternative transport routes will be taken into account. Risks relating to transport routes must be identified and there must

be preparedness to implement measures to direct transport to alternative transport routes. Volume growth in alternative transport routes will be prepared for by means of plans and exercises and, where necessary, by building the necessary infrastructure and transport capacity already in normal conditions.

The critical port network is a component of nationally safeguarded infrastructure. The functioning of transport nodes, such as land transport terminals, rail yards and airports, must be ensured. Preparedness for cybersecurity risks and threats relating to transport must be improved, and operating processes for serious information system incidents under normal conditions must be defined and practised.

Road, rail, waterway and air transport services critical for society's functioning must be safeguarded. This must also take account of the usability and availability of personnel, fleet and control systems in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions. The availability of electricity and fuels essential for critical supply chains and the functioning of information systems and payment transactions must be ensured.

The functioning of transport infrastructure is important for smooth transport. The security of supply and preparedness perspective will be taken into account on the planning, development and site prioritisation of transport infrastructure. Attention must be paid to sufficient repair capacity and related material preparedness concerning the railway network.

Industrial policy measures will be taken to maintain the sufficient international competitiveness of the shipping industry.

Close preparedness cooperation between the authorities and businesses as well as preparedness obligations set for transport-sector actors will be at the core of the safeguarding of transport continuity.

### **4.3 Food supply**

Food supply is tasked with safeguarding the sufficient availability, quality and safety of food for the population in all situations. In food supply, the entire value chain must function. Well-functioning cooperation in the food sector consists of mutually supportive functions of primary production, food industry, daily consumer goods trade and distribution as well as the food services sector and cooperation between the authorities closely relating to these.

Profitable primary production (agriculture and fishery) as well as competence and continuity safeguards are basic conditions for safeguarding food supply. Key aspects here include safeguarding the diversity and sufficient scope of primary production and ensuring the availability of critical production inputs (including safeguarding logistics) and safeguarding the digital environment for primary production. The relative share of imported raw materials and production inputs required in primary production will be reduced, where possible, by means including increasing the production of protein crops and local energy production and supporting nutrient recycling. In addition, the availability of fertilisers and fertiliser raw materials that is sufficient to safeguard national food supply must be safeguarded.

The Government will influence EU agricultural policy so that the common agricultural policy and national actions will enable the operating conditions for agriculture throughout Finland. Food production is the most important task of agriculture and the foundation of security of supply. The

objective is to ensure the continuity of self-sufficient domestic primary production that is sufficient for security of supply.

The state emergency stockpiles will hold cereals in order to secure domestic supply in case of serious incidents under normal conditions and in case of emergency conditions, so that the amount available for use corresponds to at least six months of average human consumption. The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) will, however, continuously assess the need to review the level of emergency stockpiling of cereals. Additionally, emergency stockpiling will include seeds, feed protein and other essential production inputs of primary production. The need for emergency stockpiling of feeds other than feed protein and of protein crop seeds (peas and broad beans) will also be examined. It will be ensured that feed additives authorised for reducing carry-over of contamination from feed to animals and food, as well as compound feeds containing them, will be available when necessary.

The most critical measures supporting security of supply in fisheries will be determined and implemented, including the need for emergency stockpiling for primary production with regard to critical production inputs (in particular feeds, medicines and vaccines). It will be established how the availability of fish for processing enterprises can be safeguarded in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions.

The functioning of the food market and the position of primary production will be improved. Sufficient financial resources will be reserved for plant breeding and maintenance of cultivars so that farmers will have access to plants and cultivars suitable for Finland's northern cultivation conditions in the future, too. Primary production will be helped through research and advisory services to adapt to changing climate conditions and extreme weather events. The spreading of new plant pests and animal diseases will be prevented. Horticultural peat and animal bedding peat are strategically important raw materials from Finland's food supply perspective alongside fuel peat. Ensuring the availability of peat for substrates and bedding is essential to safeguard the operating conditions of domestic horticultural and livestock production.

Preparedness for primary production and security of supply activities in case of serious incidents under normal conditions and in case of emergency conditions will be developed in cooperation between the central government, regional and local authorities, other actors including third-sector organisations, and food sector actors.

The food industry is a component of food supply for which it is important to guarantee the sufficient availability of raw materials, materials required in processes, and food packaging materials as well as uninterrupted access to energy. The emergency stockpiling of food so that it could ensure food supply on a broad scale is not realistic due to the large volumes and the issues relating to conditions and storage life involved in stockpiling. This is why the preservation of the capacity and production capability as well as the production continuity of the food industry, and the functioning of the logistics solutions of food production, must be ensured in serious incidents under normal conditions, too.

Foodstuffs account for the largest and most important part of daily consumer goods. It is essential in the supply chain of daily consumer goods trade to ensure the continuity management, preparedness and operating conditions of sourcing, distribution centres and logistics. A special development priority will be to develop the operational reliability of food logistics from primary production to retail trade throughout Finland. Going forward, actors providing food services will be taken better into account. The most important actors here are food services for schools and early childhood education and care as well as for health and social services units and other food services classified as critical. In addition to safeguarding the operational reliability of the market, alternative food

distribution models will be developed for serious incidents under normal conditions and for emergency conditions. The development of the operating conditions for the supply of daily consumer goods will continue in preparedness for serious incidents under normal conditions by building a reliable shop network. The operations of rural village shops will be supported, as the support is of significance in terms of availability of everyday services in rural areas and, consequently, security of supply in rural areas.

#### **4.4 Water services**

Water services are basic public services that must be safeguarded for communities, healthcare and social welfare units, food production, military national defence, and production and services critical for security of supply in all security situations.

The responsible authorities, water utilities and water users will take care of the sustainable use of water resources and the appropriate treatment of wastewater. The water utilities will be responsible for preparedness planning and implementation of preparedness measures, cooperating with the authorities, municipalities and their critical clients. The water utilities will prepare for incidents including physical and cybersecurity incidents, disruptions in access to electricity, energy as well as critical process chemicals and supplies and spare parts, exceptional weather and raw water situations, availability of competent personnel, and hybrid threats. Water services are also dependent on the functioning of information and communications networks and the services of research laboratories.

Regional and local authorities, water utilities and other regional actors will define the level of preparedness that ensures sufficient water services in all situations. To support the plan, the preparedness measures required nationwide, regionally and locally to reach the service level will be defined. The repair backlog of the water services infrastructure reduces operational reliability and is considerable at the nationwide level. The operational reliability and financial operating conditions of water utilities must be promoted by improving asset management and amending the structures of organising water services.

In cooperation with energy, equipment and chemicals suppliers, the water utilities will explore the conditions for creating a system for the management of distribution disruptions of critical production factors and, where possible, will proceed to implementing the system. The operational reliability of water services and efficient action in incidents require cooperation and agreement on responsibilities with various actors, such as rescue departments and other authorities, materials suppliers and service providers as well as other water utilities.

Regional and local authorities, water utilities and other regional actors, including third-sector actors, will cooperate to coordinate, including through exercises, continuity management and preparedness relating to water services and other civil engineering. Actors and places of activity critical for security of supply will define their water needs, plan their activities in case of incidents affecting water services and ensure their alternative sources for access to water in cooperation with water utilities.

#### **4.5 Waste management**

The responsible ministry will prepare the required regulations and procedures of the authorities that will enable, in extensive and serious incidents, such as exceptionally large oil and chemical spills, radiological emergencies and epizootic diseases, the collection, transport, interim storage and processing of the waste created to be organised flexibly and safely, taking account of environmental and health protection aspects.

The responsible authorities and waste-sector actors will cooperate to define the minimum level of waste management organised and sought to be ensured in all situations, and the critical sites to be prioritised in waste management. To support the plan, the preparedness measures required nationally and regionally will be defined. In addition, the role of the circular economy will be strengthened and interdependencies with other sectors will be taken into account. The responsible ministry will ensure together with the National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO) that, in case of a potential shortage of raw materials, suitable and available waste streams will be directed for these purposes.

#### **4.6 Critical industry**

The Finnish economy is dependent on a successful export industry. Ensuring the operating conditions and competitiveness of Finnish industry is the foundation of security of supply. The central government will take action to ensure that Finland will continue to have sufficient levels of industrial production as well as the competence, research and product development required. The responsible ministries will promote a competitive operating environment for business and ensure, through measures taken by the authorities, the operating conditions for safeguarding the production of commodities and critical production activity. The objective will be supported by the long-term industrial policy strategy being prepared.

The responsible ministries and the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) together with the National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO) will develop the material preparedness of critical industry and support enterprise- and sector-specific preparedness and continuity management. The critical actors will be responsible for their part for their organisation's continuity management and the development and implementation of preparedness measures supporting security of supply.

The material preparedness of critical industry must be selectively increased and the range of measures for material preparedness expanded. The significance of ensuring the availability of critical materials and metals has increased due to the growing demand for clean energy and the geopolitical situation. New tools and procedures will be developed for safeguarding availability and creating a better situation picture. Development work will take place in cooperation between the public sector and businesses.

State emergency stockpiling and security stockpiling to support the operational reliability of critical industry must be developed. In addition, contract-based partnership arrangements must be developed and utilised for critical industry. Contract-based preparedness must be increased.

#### **4.7 Construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure**

The prompt availability of construction capacity in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions must be ensured particularly to safeguard critical infrastructure. Construction-related preparedness must take account of the usability and availability of the construction and repair capacity required by society and the availability of construction products particularly during military conflicts, emergency conditions, and serious incidents under normal conditions.

Construction and the construction product industry will also prepare to support the Defence Forces if readiness is raised and in emergency conditions. The Defence Forces and the construction industry will maintain and develop contractual arrangements for preparedness construction so that the contractual arrangements can also be utilised for preparedness for serious incidents under normal conditions and for repairs and protection of society's critical infrastructure. Plans for rationing construction and construction products will be updated and regular exercises will take place

concerning their implementation. The tense security situation calls for production reservation agreements between the Defence Forces and a broader network of enterprises. More detailed storage arrangements will be made in cooperation with the Defence Forces and the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) and enterprises critical for security of supply.

The responsible authorities must create plans and administrative preparedness to rapidly implement large-scale construction projects required by national defence. The activity will take greater account of land use and its planning.

#### **4.8 Healthcare, social welfare and social security**

The preparedness of the healthcare and social welfare sector to respond to global, national and regional risks will be improved by strengthening the role of the five collaborative areas. The wellbeing services counties are key actors in the public sector, but the significant role of the private sector must also be taken into account. The National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO) will support the preparedness work of public and private healthcare and social welfare. The production of the situation picture of preparedness in healthcare and social welfare will be developed in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the centres for preparedness in healthcare and social welfare and the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL). NESO will support the production of the national situation picture for material preparedness and the private sector.

The functional capacity and resources of healthcare and social welfare must be suitable for multiple uses, taking account of serious incidents under normal conditions and of emergency conditions. NESO will support healthcare and social welfare, particularly in building and maintaining national-level capabilities for security of material supply. This cooperation must also take account of the needs of military national defence.

Healthcare and social welfare is dependent on well-functioning infrastructure, support services, diagnostics, digital information pools and systems, trained staff and healthcare and social welfare materials, devices and medicines. The continuity of services must be safeguarded in all circumstances. The security of supply of material resources of healthcare and social welfare is largely based on international markets and the imports of medicines, care supplies and medical devices. Well-functioning logistics chains are essential. The national-level development of security of supply in healthcare and social welfare will focus in particular on functions the need for which is critical or will grow significantly in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions and the safeguarding of which requires exceptional arrangements and resources. In addition to critical medical materials, the national production and service capacity for oxygen and blood products must be developed.

The availability of medical materials and devices as well as foods for special medical purposes required in the protection and treatment of the population's health and wellbeing will be safeguarded in normal and emergency conditions in cooperation with the service system and the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA). The Act on the Compulsory Stockpiling of Medicines (979/2008) will be reformed. The roles and duties of public, private and third-sector actors in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions as well as in preparedness will be specified clearly in legislation.

The domestic production of materials and products critical for the functioning of healthcare and social welfare will be safeguarded as far as possible. Cooperation will be developed with the wellbeing services counties to minimise wastage and to ensure sufficient stock rotation. NESA's role is to

ensure, where necessary, availability through, for example, supplementary stockpiling or contracts ensuring availability.

In social welfare, the NESO operating models will be developed and expanded to apply to critical private social welfare actors. At the same time, particular attention will be paid to social welfare's sufficient own material preparedness and, where necessary, this will be supported by state emergency stockpiling.

The preparedness of healthcare and social welfare must be fit for coordination with structures of international cooperation (such as the EU, NATO and Nordic cooperation). The conditions for providing and receiving international assistance must be ensured. Cooperation must be developed at the European and in particular Nordic level to ensure the availability of the most important medicines, medical products and solutions for infusion in Finland.

Safeguarding the continuity of the infrastructure relating to social security is essential in particular to safeguard the livelihood of the population receiving various benefits. To safeguard the payment of benefits and the livelihood of the population, it is necessary to continue the development of the actors' own backup arrangements and the cooperation of the insurance sector in preparedness. Dependencies common in the financial sector are key aspects from the perspective of the functioning of social security. The preparedness of these actors and the sector's cooperation bodies, and also the compatibility of the arrangements for emergency conditions, must be ensured with advance measures.

#### **4.9 Financial services**

Certain payment, account and securities services provided by financial sector operators for citizens, enterprises, other organisations and the government are critical. For the functional capacity of society and the livelihood of the population, enterprises in the sector must safeguard critical services in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions. Critical payment services include at least account transfers and recurring payments, daily payment services such as card payment services, cash services, interbank payments, and debt management services. Critical securities services include trading, clearing, settlement and custody of securities, and funding and use of securities holdings of central government and enterprises and organisations critical for society's functioning.

The financial sector is highly dependent on factors including services and infrastructure located in Europe, the broad-scale functioning of digital society, telecommunications, and continuous access to electricity. The opportunity to use international services will be ensured as far as possible, but the supply of critical payment and securities services must be ensured by means of domestic backup arrangements. Regulation will be updated as necessary to promote preparedness concerning critical services.

The security of supply in financial administration will be developed in the cooperation structure for security of supply. Key financial administration processes include payroll administration services, processing of purchase and sales invoices, and handling of payment transactions.

#### **4.10 Climate change, extreme weather events and space weather**

The global challenges as well as opportunities created by climate change have both direct and indirect impacts on Finland's security of supply. Some of the risks relate directly to Finland's national critical infrastructure and security of supply, but incidents and multiplier effects in international value chains

in particular can also be seen indirectly in Finland. The positive and negative transition impacts of climate change mitigation affect the operating environment of security of supply and must be taken into account in preparedness.

The risks, vulnerabilities and risk areas created for security of supply by climate change, biodiversity loss, extreme weather events and space weather as well as the impacts concerning the safeguarding of security of supply and society's vital functions must be identified and managed better than before.

Research and development activity concerning climate change as well as space storms and other natural risks relating to space will be targeted so that the critical service providers and infrastructure managers are better able to prepare for the risks and impacts related to these phenomena.

Preparedness and risk reduction require the production of practical information and the maintenance of risk analysis, identification and understanding of the impacts and risks of the phenomena with regard to functions, services and infrastructure critical for security of supply. The National Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO) is tasked with ensuring comprehensive and coordinated preparedness for the cross-cutting security of supply risks and impacts relating to climate and space.

#### **4.11 Space sector**

The space-based services required for society's functioning and the authorities' work will be available to security of supply, security and defence actors in all situations, potential incidents will have been prepared for and the impacts of incidents on the authorities' and society's activities can be minimised. This calls for national capabilities, international cooperation and the strengthening and utilisation of Finland's national characteristics.

Finland will develop national capability by strengthening its own national competence particularly in satellite signal processing and the operation of ground-based infrastructure. International cooperation plays a key role in the development of space-based capabilities. Finland will operate actively in the European Union, the European Space Agency (ESA) and NATO to reach the capabilities required.

Society's preparedness and security will be improved on a broad scale by means including the development of the maintenance of the national space situation picture. In addition, the value chains and infrastructures relating to the utilisation of space services will be identified and risks threatening their continuity will be prepared for. The availability of capabilities requiring international cooperation will be maintained and ensured through cooperation agreements, active participation in satellite system development, and operational cooperation.

The national space strategy for 2024–2030 will define the goals, objectives and measures for Finland's space activities.

#### **4.12 Security of supply of the rescue services, civil defence and the police**

The internationally changed security situation and the threats created by climate change pose new challenges for the rescue services and civil defence. The threat of use of military force and the risk of serious incidents and major accidents caused by extreme weather events increasing due to climate change must be taken more strongly into account as starting points for the rescue services and civil defence. Finland's NATO membership and the threat of use military force also emphasise the need in the rescue services for increased cooperation, coordination and exchange of information between military and non-military preparedness activity, particularly in preparedness for civil defence.

Maintenance of public order and security will enable the continuity of society's vital functions. The services and functions of the police, the rescue services and civil defence are an important component of internal security. They will protect the civilian population and safeguard the operating conditions of critical infrastructure and security of supply. Their incident-free operation plays a key role in coping with serious incidents under normal conditions as well as in emergency conditions.

Long-term planning and preparedness as well as sufficient resourcing are required by the extensive range of duties of the rescue services and civil defence from accident prevention to the protection of the civilian population against the dangers of armed aggression, and by the competence base and material preparedness required for the performance of these duties.

The critical capability areas for the security of supply of the rescue services and civil defence are command and communication, alerting and warning the population, and material logistics and related technical systems. The domestic production of materials and products critical for the rescue services, civil defence and the police should be safeguarded and ensured by means of national and regional stockpiling and agreements ensuring availability.

#### **4.13 Information delivery**

Information delivery covers content production, publication in physical or electronic format, and either targeted or mass distribution by mass media committed to journalistic principles.

Safeguarding the operating conditions of free and pluralistic information delivery that supports society's security and responsible freedom of expression in all circumstances is one of the priorities of safeguarding society. It is essential to safeguard mass communication and its infrastructures.

Social media is an important part of the media environment. False information also spreads rapidly in social media services. It can be used as a tool for intentional and harmful information influence activities. There must be capability to monitor the impacts of content from non-journalistic processes on security and security of supply.

#### **4.14 Military security of supply**

The preparedness of civilian society must be taken into consideration as an enabler and counterpart of military preparedness; the concept for comprehensive security will only work if the objective of security of supply activities is to safeguard the continuity of society's vital functions in serious incidents under normal conditions and in emergency conditions. The capacity of civilian society to function in the conditions of a military conflict will in the current security environment also decide the level of comprehensive defence.

The changed security situation presents Finland with new security challenges. The threat of use of military force against Finland must be adopted more strongly as a key starting point for non-military preparedness activity, too. Finland's NATO membership emphasises the need for coordination and exchange of information between military and non-military preparedness activity.

The broad competence base required by national defence calls for long-term and secure resourcing. National research and innovation policy must be targeted systematically at themes taking account of the interests of military national defence and national security, too. Ensuring and developing competence and domestic security of supply call for long-term cooperation between universities, research institutes, education and training providers and domestic defence industry enterprises.

Sufficiently sovereign defence industry production operating in Finland, essential emergency stockpiles and technological competence supporting national defence will lay the foundation for security of supply. The critical capability areas of military security of supply include C3 and network activities, intelligence, surveillance and target support, joint effects targeting as well as force protection.

It is of key importance to ensure the incident-free maintenance of critical technical systems and the production of critical consumption materiel, such as ammunition, used in national defence. Capacity for integration, upkeep and maintenance of systems critical for capability relating to national defence must also be available in emergency conditions to a sufficient extent and at the required speed. The independent use of the most critical systems must be ensured nationally.

With digitalisation advancing, digital security is emphasised. The significance of cybersecurity and encryption technologies is growing. The increasingly strong role of emerging disruptive technologies in particular must be taken into account in solutions relating to national defence industry production and technological competence.

With Finland being a NATO member, the export conditions and internationalisation of Finnish defence industry must be promoted, as this will at the same time nationally strengthen both military defence and security of supply. Military security of supply will also be created through closer cooperation between domestic and foreign industry, which will contribute to the promotion and strengthening of interdependence.

It will be ensured nationally that domestic service providers will continue to play a key role in safeguarding military security of supply. The activity can be promoted by developing and deepening existing preparedness models. Production reservation, war economy, framework and partnership agreements will be employed in long-term cooperation where the service provider will, where necessary, prepare for and commit to providing the services in emergency conditions, too.

The Finnish defence administration will promote bilateral and multilateral security of supply cooperation to enable joint development, distribution and use of military capabilities. In addition to important bilateral relations, cooperation with NATO, the EU and Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEF) will play a key role. In particular ammunition logistics and production, and the maintenance and storage of armaments, will be at the core of Nordic cooperation. Cooperation between the Defence Forces and the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) will be deepened in material preparedness, planning, situation awareness and exchange of information, exercise activity and international cooperation. The conditions and arrangements for cooperation between the defence administration and NESA during crises will be assessed and specified further in light of the new security challenges.

The conditions for the efficient reception and provision of external military assistance (including Host Nation Support) will be ensured as part of the development of national defence. In international cooperation, the creation of comprehensive and binding military security of supply arrangements will be promoted. As part of the internationalising dimension of security of supply, the development of land links and Finland's internal links replacing sea links must be speeded up. Rail transport in particular is at the core when solving the implementation of critical material flows in the new security policy situation. Project implementation must make full use of the various international (EU, NATO) funding mechanisms.

## **5. Development and funding of security of supply activities**

Security of supply will be developed as a long-term effort on the basis of the development objectives outlined in the Government Report on Security of Supply (Government Report 8/2022) prepared in a parliamentary process.

Funding the security of supply measures defined as the responsibility of the authorities is part of the normal financial and operational planning of the ministries and the agencies and public bodies in their administrative branch. The administrative branches will implement the measures specified in this decision on objectives to the extent possible within their resources. Measures requiring funding will be discussed and decided separately in the Budget and General Government Fiscal Plan processes. As outlined in the Government Report on Security of Supply, long-term security of supply functions for normal conditions belonging to the sectoral ministries' responsibilities that can be funded from the main title of expenditure of the responsible ministry in the State Budget will not, as a general rule, be funded from the National Emergency Supply Fund.

The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) will prepare for being able to provide, without delay in emergency conditions and comparable serious incidents, funding from the National Emergency Supply Fund for central government measures necessary due to incidents. The carrying capacity of the National Emergency Supply Fund must be assessed and safeguarded so that the statutory measures laid down for the use of the National Emergency Supply Fund as well as the measures relating to preparedness and serious incidents can be funded in all circumstances. In conjunction with the reform of security of supply legislation, the funding system for security of supply and the emergency supply contribution will be examined to strengthen the funding base of security of supply activities and to preserve the carrying capacity of the Fund.

The monitoring of the appropriations used for security of supply will be developed to enable better assessments of the financial resources used annually for security of supply work. It is challenging to obtain comprehensive data on funding from the State Budget, as funding for safeguarding security of supply and for preparedness is often budgeted within funding for other functions.

Separate provisions on the authorities' obligation to prepare for emergency conditions are laid down in section 12 of the Emergency Powers Act (1552/2011). The authorities must take account of the costs of these preparedness measures in the allocation of their operating expenses. Separate provisions are laid down on the funding of the authorities' activities during special situations.

## **6. Monitoring of the Government's objectives**

Progress made in the objectives set by the Government concerning the safeguarding of security of supply will be monitored regularly. Responsibility for the monitoring duty lies with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, which will prepare a plan for the implementation of this decision on objectives in cooperation with the ministries and the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA). The implementation plan will define the responsibilities of the various authorities and the more detailed time frames for the measures.

*Adopted 24<sup>th</sup> October 2024*